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Davis: Publication Of Libel In Montana: Lewis v. Reader's Digest Association

PUBLICATION OF LIBEL IN MONTANA:
LEWIS V. READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION
Maxon R. Davis

THE COMMON LAW HERITAGE AND MODERN REACTION TO IT
The purest treasure mortal times afford
Is spotless reputation; that away,

Men are but gilded loam or painted clay.
A jewel in a ten-times-barr'd-up chest
Is a bold spirit in a loyal breast.
Mine honour is my life; both grow in one;
Take honour from me, and my life is done.

-Richard II,I.i.177-83.
Possessed no doubt with the same nobility of character as voiced
by Shakespeare's Duke of Norfolk, and sufficiently aggrieved by the
continued circulation of an allegedly libelous report, William, Duke of
Norfolk and Luneborg, one day in the autumn of 1847 directed a servant to obtain a copy of the local newspaper which was carrying the
alleged defamation. On September 26, 1847, the servant did procure
such a copy from one Harmer, the owner of the Weekly Dispatch. In the
ensuing libel action commenced by the Duke,' the court agreed that the
sale of this one copy of the newspaper to the plaintiff's agent was a sufficient publication of the defamation so as to be actionable within the
six-year statute of limitations. Liability attached despite the fact that
the defendant had actually printed the copy in question on September
19, 1830, seventeen years earlier.
From the Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer stems the common law rule
that "every sale or delivery of each single copy of a newspaper is a
distinct publication, and a separate basis for a cause of action."'2 The
doctrine serves as an extension of the definition of "publication," used
in the context of defamation. Publication here is any unprivileged communication of the defamatory material to a third person who in turn
comprehends it meaning. 3 Today, then, under this "multiple publication"
rule, the publisher of a libelous statement in a nationally circulated newspaper, magazine, or book risks potential liability in as many separate
causes of action as he has readers. The disruptive potentialities of this
rule as applied to the mass media in the twentieth century have thrown
it into disfavor with both commentators 4 and courts. 5
'Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849).
2

PROSSER, LAW Op TORTS § 113 at 769 (4th ed. 1970); see HARPER AND JAMES, LAW

TORTS § 5.15 at 390 (1956).
Ar. Jun. 2D Libel and Slander § 146 (1970); HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 2;
Prosser, supra note 2 at 766; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 577 (1938).
'Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 960-962 (1953). While no
plaintiff has of yet fully exploited the possibilities inherent in the multiple publication rule, Dean Prosser notes several instances of near abuse. A Professor Hartmann,
accused of being a fascist in a 1944 issue of Life magazine, brought six suits against
Time, Inc. Accused of being a drug addict, the late Annie Oakley successfully prosecuted forty-eight of fifty actions brought against different newspapers carrying the
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On a more practical level, the multiple publication rule allows for a
plaintiff to easily circumvent, if not outrightly nullify, statutes of limitations, as the Brunswick case illustrates. Statutes of limitations applicable to libel and slander are relatively short, commonly varying from
six months to two years in the United States.6 As such, "these statutes
definitely evidence a public policy favoring early trial and either quick
recovery or quick death for a type of tort action that is peculiarly volatile and transient because the interest protected is the intangible and
changeable thing called personal reputation."' Faced with their facile
avoidance, courts in state after state began to hold that a plaintiff
could maintain but a single cause of action for a libel printed in one
edition of a mass-distributed publication.8 At the same time, these holdings served to remove the possibility of a defendant being subjected to
repeated suits in each state in which a plaintiff could obtain jurisdictionthe decisions of none of which could serve as res judicata in any of the
others.9 Such decisions were based on the practical consideration that
the mass communication of a single defamatory statement is but one
wrong and should be actionable as a single tort.10
This principle gained further credence with the promulgation by
the American Law Institute of the Uniform Single Publication Act, so
far adopted by seven states and one territory." Furthermore, in a contradiction of the RESTATE-MENT OF TORTS, which accepted the common law

Associated Press story. And, finally, an Ohio congressman, Martin Sweeney, accused
of anti-semitism by the late Drew Pearson, initiated somewhere between sixty-eight
and three hundred actions against newspapers carrying the latter's column. Id. at
969 nn. 56-60.
t
Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Co., 317 F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1963); Tocco v. Time,
Inc., 195 F. Supp. 410, 412-13 (E.D. Mich. 1961); see also cases infra note 9.
650 Am. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 390 (1970). In Montana: REVISED CODES OF
MONTANA, § 93-2606 (1947), provide "Within two years: .. . (3) An action for libel,
slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction."
Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 263, 265 (1953).

sAge-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 S. 193 (1921); Winrod v.
Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E.2d 708 (1948); Forman v. Mississippi Publishing
Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 S.2d 344 (1943); Wolfsohn v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254
App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1938),

aff'd, 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676

(1939);

Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45, reh. denied, 298 N.Y.
753, 83 N.E.2d 152 (1948) (extending the doctrine to books).
'Prosser, supra note 4 at 968.
10

HARPER AND JAMES, supra note 2 at 395.

"UNIFORM

SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT, 9C UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 173 (1957).
The
act provides in part:
"§
1. No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel
or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single edition,
publication or utterance, such as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine
or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television
or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all
damages for any tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
§ 2. A judgment in any jurisdiction for or against the plaintiff upon the substantive merits of any action for damages founded upon a single publication or exhibition or utterance as described in Section 1 shall bar any other action for damages
founded upon the same publication or exhibition or utterance.''

Adopted in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and the Panama Canal Zone. .d. at 171 (Supp. 1967).
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rule,' 2 the RESTATEMENT SECOND (Twelfth Tentative Draft), has opted for
13
the single publication standard.
PROBLEMS WITH THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE
Even with the growing body of authority favoring the single publication rule, there remain critics not yet convinced of the rule's intrinsic
superiority to the pre-existing common law rule. 1 4 Several states still
adhere to the multiple publication rule,' 5 recognizing a separate basis
of liability in each reader of the libel. Difficulties in the application
of the single publication rule include the question of exactly when the
single publication occurs in the writing-printing-distributing process in
order for the statute of limitations to start running. More than once, a
plaintiff's attorney, in misguided reliance on the cover date of the periodical, has filed an action which the court then determined to be barred
by the statute of limitations, it having opted to find publication in some
earlier act in the printing and distributing continuum.'6
Also, since the tort of defamation contemplates an injury to reputation-to the drop in esteem with which third parties regard the plaintiff
-the distribution of a libel on a nationwide scale raises a troublesome
conflict of laws problem for the court in which a plaintiff decides to
prosecute his single claim for relief. Two commentators each list ten

12RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 578 (1938), comment b states in part: "Each time a libelous article is brought to the attention of a third person, a new publication has occurred, and each publication is a separate tort. Thus, each time a libelous book or
paper or magazine is sold, a new publication has taken place which, if the libel is false
and unprivileged, will support a separate action for damages against the seller."
13RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) provides: " (3)
Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one broadcast over radio or television,
exhibition of a motion picture, or similar aggregate communication, is a single publication.
(4) As to any single publication,
(a) Only one action for damages can be maintained;
(b) All damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in one action;
and
(c) A judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the substantive merits of an
action for damages bars any other action for damages between the same
parties in all jurisdictions.''
"Leflar, supra note 7; Note, The Single Publication Rule in Libel: A Fiction Misapplied, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1041 (1949).
"Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D.Wash. 1943), appeal disnissed,
144 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1943); Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736
(W.D.Wisc. 1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1948); Staub v. Van Benthuysen,
36 La. Ann. 467 (1848); Louisville Press Co. v. Tennelly, 105 Ky. 365, 49 S.W. 15
(1899).
'"Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948); Tocco v. Time, Inc., supra
note 5; Winrod v. McFadden Publications, 62 F. Supp. 249 (N.D.Ill. 1945), aff'd,
187 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 814 (1951); McGlue v. Weekly
Publications, 63 F. Supp. 744 (D.Mass. 1946); Backus v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); Means v. McFadden, 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Belli v.
Roberts Brothers Furs, 240 Cal. App. 2d 284, 49 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964); Winrod v.
Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E.2d 708 (1948); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 60
N.Y.S.2d 209 (S.Ct. 1945).
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different criteria which courts can employ in their determination as to
17
which forum's laws shall apply.
THE MONTANA POSITION
Within this historical context, the Montana Supreme Court took
under certification in 1973 from the Federal District Court 8 the question
of whether the state was to adopt the single publication rule or adhere
to the common law multiple publication standard. In its declaratory
judgment, Lewis v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.,' 9 the state tribunal
voiced an unequivocal preference for the multiple publication rule, finding little merit in the alternative:
Despite the numerial weight of authority following the single
publication rule, we consider it unsound. Conceived as a judge-made
rule to serve the interests of judicial administration and expediency,
it nevertheless is wrong 'in principle and in practice creates far graver
problems than it solves.
This harsh evaluation of the single publication rule is later tempered
by closing remarks recognizing a need to balance the at times conflicting interests of private citizens and of a free press, both of whom have
constitutionally protected rights. 2' Still, the decision of the Montana
Supreme Court rests squarely upon the previously mentioned uncertainties with the newer standard-of when publication occurs in relation to
the statute of limitations and of which forum's laws control in the face
of an interstate distribution of the libel.
With such numerical weight of authority having reached the opposite
conclusion, the Montana position as expressed in Lewis is open to immediate question. One notes that various courts have been laboring under
the single publication rule for years. The validity of the Lewis opinion
must then depend on whether or not such courts have fashioned workable solutions to the recognized problems of single publication.
JUDICIAL DEFINITIONS OF SINGLE PUBLICATION
While proof that the libel has been read may now be inferred under
the single publication rule, 22 the plaintiff cannot now rely on an equally
fixed moment from which to measure the run of the statute of limita-

17Leflar, supra note 7 at 270-71; Prosser, supra note 4 at 971-77.
"Lewis v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 154 (D.Mont. 1973). Without reference to the declaratory judgment, the District Court granted summary judgment on the defendant's motion, ruling that reference to the plaintiff's ''health
mine" in Boulder, Montana, in an article about quack cures for arthritis, was constitutionally privileged. The Court cited N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
as controlling.
"Lewis v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.. ......
Mont. .......
, 512 P.2d 702 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Lewis].
11d. at 704.
1Id. at 706.
"Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., supra note 5 at 729; Killian v. Stackpole Sons,
Inc., 98 F. Supp. 500, 504 (M.D.Pa. 1951).
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tions. With the consolidation of the injury caused by countless defamations into one claim for relief, the question becomes at what point in
the revelation process-printing, distributing, selling-is the action complete.
The judicial response has not been uniform. With magazines and
newspapers, courts have not felt limited by the cover date. 23 This judicial disregard is appropriate in light of modern circulation methods,
whereby periodicals are often placed on sale at newstands and mailed
to subscribers days, if not weeks, before the printed cover date. Many
third parties have seen the libel already; a strict adherence to the statutory command limiting a plaintiff to so many days in which to file
his complaint would demand fixing the cause of action as complete at
some previous point. An early standard found publication instead occurring upon the mailing of the libelous matter to subscribers or upon its
being placed in the hands of common carriers for shipment to wholesale
distributors. 24 Equally arbitrary was the rule that the single publication
claim was complete when the periodicals were placed on sale at newsstands in the forum state, 25 although this position impliedly demands an
awareness on the part of the plaintiff of the tortious conduct prior to
accrual of his action. Such fixed definitions have since developed into
the "initial publication" standard. 26 Manifestly vague, such language
best applies to the release of books, where one wishes to preclude liability for a later distribution from stock beyond the first release.2 7 Although originally employed in the context of periodicals, 28 its application there carries the potentiality for injustice, imposing on the plaintiff the burden of ascertaining facts frequently known exclusively by
the defendant in order to determine the timeliness of his claim. In one
such instance, a court relied on the late night first edition of a morning
newspaper to bar a plaintiff's claim filed 365 days after the morning
29
delivery to the great mass of subscribers.
Critics of initial publication-including the Montana Supreme Court
in Lewis30 raise the spectre of an unscrupulous publisher who takes advantage of the rule by effecting a limited distribution in some remote
corner of the nation in order to commence the run of the statute of
limitations. His subsequent widespread dissemination will then be accomplished with immunity from suit. This devious fellow has yet to appear,
Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1948); Tocco v. Time, Inc., supra
note 5.
24Backus v. Look, Inc., supra note 16.
2Folchlopak v. American News Co., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 309 (D.Mass. 1947).
2I5artmann v. Time, Inc., supra note 23; Killian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., supra note 22;
Belli v. Roberts Brothers Furs, supra note 16.
'"SeeOgden v. Association of the United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498 (D.D.C. 1959);
Killian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., supra note 22.
"See Hartman v. Time, Inc., supra note 23.
2Belli v. Roberts Brothers Furs, supra note 16.
3OLewis, supra note 19 at 705. See Dominiak v. National Enquirer, 439 Pa. 222, 266
A.2d 626, 629 (1970) ; Note, supra note 14 at 1043.
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but even if he does, the more flexible judicial standards described below
will prove adequate. Indeed, where the Lewis opinion states that "the
single publication rule, however, does not solve the problem,"'31 the
Court seems to imply that the failure of other courts working under single
publication to seize upon a uniform holding regarding the statute of limitations indicates a basic inadequacy in the rule. Criticism of decisions
relying on initial publicaton and of like instances of questionable judicial reasoning is proper. On the other hand, the blanket dismissal evidenced by such language fails to take into account the imaginative holdings of courts which were able to arrive at an opposite conclusion in
their interpretations of the same rule.
A first attempt at tempering the harshness of initial publication
allowed recovery of damages for the mailing of replacement copies of
a magazine, although the statute of limitations did bar a claim on the
primary-and massive-distribution of the libel.3 2 This holding was
later explicitly rejected, 3 in apparent recognition of the same potentiality for injustice as illustrated in the Brunswick case. Now the initial
claim is interpreted to encompass the mailing of replacement copies from
stock for both magazines3 4 and books, 3 5 although liability does attach
to the subsequent reprinting of a libelous article in a later issue of a
37
magazine3 6 and to the reprinting or new edition of a book.
Referring to the one-time-only distribution of a political pamphlet,
a New York state supreme court in Stella v. James J. Parley Ass'n.
determined the date of single publication to be "when the great mass
of the issue reaches those for whom the publication is intended. '38 A
refinement, Sorge v. Parade Publications,Inc.,3 9 which extends the application of Stella to a nationally distributed Sunday newspaper supplement, specifically disapproves of the delivery to common carrier standard, focusing again on the "completed distribution '40 of the material:
"Publication occurred when the matter was availed of for its ultimate

"Lewis, supra note 19 at 705.
IWinrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., supra note 16.
'Winrod v. Time, Inc., supra note 16
"Cannon v. Time, Inc., supra note 16.
15Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, supra note 9; Ogden v. Association of the United
States Army, supra note 27.
mHartmann v. Time, Inc., supra note 23; Gallo Electronics Corp. v. Consumers Union
of the United States, Inc., 47 Misc.2d 914, 263 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1965).
37Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1967).
'Stella v. James J. Farley Ass'n., 204 Misc. 998, 122 N.Y.S.2d 322, 330 (1953);
accord, Osmers v. Parade Publications, 234 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
$'Sorge v. Parade Publications, Inc., 20 A.D.2d 338, 247 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1964).
'Sec Note, The Single Publication-Which One?, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 400. The author reviews
the progress of single publication in the Pennsylvania courts, finding a basis for a
completed distribution theory in Jackson v. Ideal Publishing Corporation,274 F. Supp.
318 (E.D.Pa. 1967), although the rule in Jackson was apparently drawn from a misreading of a previous case. Nonetheless, the author makes a cogent argument in
support of the doctrine.
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purpose by public distribution .... It is the date of actual distribution
'4 1
rather than what may be termed 'release date' which controls."
These trial court decisions from New York were handed down within
42
the theoretical framework provided by Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons,
wherein the New York Court of Appeals-specifically extending the
single publication doctrine to books-found the cause of action to be
complete "when the finished producct is released by the publisher for
sale in accord with trade practice.1 43 Confusion does exist as to when
this release occurs. Other courts have viewed the Gregoire rule as an
endorsement of initial publication ;44 yet, both Stella and Sorge also cite
Gregoire as controlling.45 While "the New York Court of Appeals has not
yet resolved the conflicting interpretations of its Gregoire test of
accural, '46 there is no reason, as both Stella and Sorge illustrate, why
release in accord with trade practice cannot refer to the final distribution of the material to the parties to whom it is intended.
Alternative dates for the fixing of the time of accural of the
cause of action for libel will normally fall within a few days or weeks
of each other. As the time interval between the suggested alternative accrual dates increases, however, it becomes clear that the
later the time of accrual the fairer the operation of the single publication rule."

If the action is not complete until the publication reaches "the great
mass for whom it is intended," the plaintiff has been placed in a more
favorable postion to so determine the accural date. He need not search
for that first revelation to a third party-at some obscure point in the
distribution process. Furthermore, taken in the context of "trade practice," this completed distribution standard provides no protection for
the unscrupulous publisher, who is held to the standard provided by
his more ethical colleagues.
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PROBLEM: WHOSE FORUM?
While "the statue of limitations problem remains the most important
area in which the single publication rule operates, ' 48 of subsidiary yet
noteworthy concern is the demand placed upon the trier of fact to unravel a perplexing conflict of laws knot. The traditional rule for tortslex loci delictus-applied the law of the forum in which the tortious
conduct has its impact. 49 When the injury is one to reputation, the theor"Sorge v. Parade Publications, Inc., supra note 39 at 322.
' 2Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, supra note 9.
"Id.at 49.
"Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); Cassius v. Mortimer,
161 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Killian v. Stackpole Sons., Inc., supra note 22.
"Stella v. James J. Farley Ass'n., supra note 38 at 322; Sorge v. Parade Publications,
Inc., supra note 39 at 317.
"Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., supra note 5 at 731.
"Id.
'sLeflar, supra note 7 at 271.
' 9Prosser, supra note 4 at 971; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT or L&ws § 377 (1934).
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etical niceties inherent in the choice of laws are imposing; when a single
claim for relief contemplates an interstate, perhaps national, publication,
they become awesome. As noted above, two commentators each propose
ten alternatives as a basis for decision;5° their lists are not identical.
The choice being then dependent upon the court's perception of the injury, one can only classify as an understandable judicial abdication
the fact that in a plurality of cases the court applied the law of the
forum, 51 without a convincing demonstration of its relationship to the
injury to the plaintiff's reputation. On a practical level, one notes that
such holdings invite forum shopping by plaintiffs.
One attempt at a solution would have the law of the forum in which
the material was first published control. 52 Here again, the consideration
of greatest impact on the plaintiff's reputation appears depreciated.
Curiously, the Montana Supreme Court notes in Lewis that a more equitable rule would be to allow the law of the plaintiff's domicile to control.53 This preference apparently was voiced in light of the potentiality
for forum shopping under the multiple publication rule also. The Court
declares that "the single publication rule, however, does not solve the
problem," citing Hartmann v. Time,14 wherein the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals did look to the state of initial publication. In response, one
can only point out that the cited case, admittedly open to criticism, is
not controlling. The Second Circuit has more recently rejected this same
argument, holding that "the single publication rule did not make the
tort so 'complete' at the place of publication as to preclude application
'55
of the substantive law of plaintiff's domicile.
Indeed, the RESTATEMENT SECOND OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS agrees
with the Montana Supreme Court in preferring the plaintiff's domicile. The
general rule offered therein-that multi-state defamation is controlled
"by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrance and the
parties. . ."--is qualified by the statement that "the state of most significant relationship will usually be the state where the person was
domiciled at the time, if the matter complained of was published in
that state. '57 The Restatement language does provide the requisite
flexibility for the situation in which a convincing factual presentation
rebuts the assumption that the plaintiff's domicile is the locale where
the impact is greatest; yet, as a general principle it goes far to allevi-

5OLeflar, supra note 17; Prosser, supra note 17.
"Prosser, supra note 4 at 978.
12Hartmann v. Time, Inc., supra note 23; Association for the Preservation of Freedom
of Choice, Inc. v. Simon, 299 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1963).
5'Lewis, supra note 19 at 705.
4Hartmann v. Time, Inc., supra note 23.
'6Buckley v. New York Post Corp., supra note 44 at 180.
MRESTATEMENT (SBFCOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150(1) (1971).
-7Id.
§ 150(2).
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ate the conflict of laws problem. As regards the Lewis opinion, the
subsequent commentary5" makes clear that these rules were developed to
meet the demands of the prevailing single standard.
CONCLUSION
A review of the admittedly divergent applications of the single
publication rule reveals lines of judicial interpretation that answer the
complaints voiced in Lewis. Adoption of the single publication rule does
not mean that the initial publication must control questions of timeliness
and of the conflict of laws. Courts have evidenced the freedom to move
away from the less flexible standards criticized by the Montana Supreme
Court. By holding that a plaintiff's single claim for relief accrues upon
receipt of that libel by the great mass of people for whom it is intended,
these courts have insured the diligent complainant his day in court.
Also, there is ample authority to support the application of the law of
the plaintiff's domicile in resolution of a complex conflict of laws problem, when, as is often the case, the action contemplates a national
distribution of the libel.
In short, single publication can work not only to the benefit of
the defendant, by reducing the scope of his liability, but also to the
advantage of the plaintiff, by providing him a convenient forum in
which to try one action for widespread injury. The alternative-of adherence to multiple publication-raises the nightmarish spectre of a
judicial system paralyzed by the countless suits arising from one
libelous statement. It also allows for the easy frustration of the statute
of limitations, which is a clear expression of the legislative policy of
giving such actions a short life.
One can hope that the Montana Supreme Court will seriously reconsider its position in Lewis if ever again directly presented with the
question of the publication of libel. If not, it remains a proper consideration for the legislature, which, by adopting the Uniform Single Publication
Act, could prod the judiciary into a re-examination of the progressive
approaches to single publication evidenced by the foreign jurisdictions
mentioned above.

5'1d. § 150, comments b and e.
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